Under
 the chairmanship of President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, the main role of 
EASF is seen as fighting the conflict in Somalia, and is expected to 
have the full support of its various governments.
The 
truth is, the formation of an Eastern African Standby Force in response 
to the threat of the Al-Shabaab group is neither novel concept nor 
unexpected.
The Harakat Al-Shabaab Mujahideen (HSM) 
group, an Islamic extremist group that seeks to set up an Islamic state 
in Somalia, was formed as the militant wing of the Islamic Courts Union 
(ICU), which at the time controlled much of central and southern 
Somalia.
Since the ICU lost power, Al-Shabaab has waged
 a relentless war against the then Somali Transitional Government, its 
successive established regimes and its Ethiopian supporters, with 
fighting escalating from May 2009.
In 2007, the 
formation of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) under the 
auspices of the African Union’s Peace and Security Council , as 
documented in Security Council Resolution 1744 (2007) meant that the 
troubled Somali Transitional Government now had the support of an AU-led
 peace keeping force.
CROSS BORDER ATTACKS
Al-Shabaab
 claimed its first terror attack outside Somali borders in June 2010 in 
Uganda during the World Cup finals, in which 70 people were killed and 
several injured. At the time Al-Shabaab threatened additional attacks if
 Uganda and other AU Countries did not withdraw AMISOM peace keeping 
troops.
At the time, the AMISOM mission was meant to 
last only 6 months, a temporary measure intended to support what it was 
hoped would be a quickly stabilized government. The 6-month deadline 
came and passed without this being accomplished.
By 
October 2011, it was clear that the Al-Shabaab group was a bigger threat
 to neighbouring Kenya after consistent cross border attacks left 
several people dead. In response, Kenya launched “Operation Linda Nchi” a
 military incursion by the Kenya Defense Forces into Somalia.
It
 is this particular act that seems to have refocused Al-Shabaab’s 
onslaught to Kenya. Since 2011, attacks within Kenyan borders have 
increased in frequency and intensity, with people being killed in 
attacks on ‘soft’ targets such as churches, shopping malls, markets and 
public vehicles. After the recent killings in Lamu the terrorist group 
warned the government of further attacks.
The decision by Mr Lenku to label the attacks
 on Mpeketoni as politically instigated and targeted at a particular 
ethnic community was strange, and also indicative of the distracted 
manner in which the entire ministry has approached the war on 
Al-Shabaab.
Make no mistake, Kenya is at war, and the 
use of the Eastern African Standby Force is an indication that this war 
is greater than the Kenya government cares to admit. The EASF is likely 
to provide a succinct “punch” against the forces of Al-Shabaab.  
However,
 much like AMISOM and “Operation Linda Nchi”, without a complimentary 
“block” in the internal structures of the concerned nations, terror 
groups may be able to hit back.
We can visibly see the 
effects of years of corruption in the police service especially. It is 
certainly necessarily to thoroughly examine the management of the police
 service and to extract the elements that hinder its success.
Twitter: @bettywaitherero
 
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